Elections, specially in countries such as Brazil with an electorate of the order of 100 million people, yield large-scale data-sets embodying valuable information on the dynamics through which individuals influence each other and make choices. In this work we perform an extensive analysis of data sets available for Brazilian proportional elections of legislators and city councillors throughout the period 1970-2012, which embraces two distinct political regimes: a military dictatorship and a democratic phase. Through the distribution P (v) of the number of candidates receiving v votes, we perform a comparative analysis of different elections in the same calendar and as a function of time. The distributions P (v) present a scale-free regime with a power-law exponent α which is not universal and appears to be characteristic of the electorate. Moreover, we observe that α typically increases with time. We propose a multi-species model consisting in a system of nonlinear differential equations with stochastic parameters that allows to understand the empirical observations. We conclude that the power-law exponent α constitutes a measure of the degree of feedback of the electorate interactions. To know the interactivity of the population is relevant beyond the context of elections, since a similar feedback may occur in other social contagion processes.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few decades, special attention has sparked amongst statistical physicists the study of elections [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . An election can be seen as a large scale event that provides a huge amount of real data about people choices resulting from collective processes. Then, its analysis may reveal important hints on how people are influenced and opinions propagate. The number of data is particularly huge in countries such as Brazil, with a large and diversified electorate. Moreover, differently from the case of presidential or governor elections, with few candidates, in an election for legislators or for city councillors, there is also a large number of candidates, of the order of a few thousands in the whole country. This provides a wide spectrum of choices that allow to probe how people preferences distribute.
Plausibly following these motivations, pioneering works analyzed the Brazilian proportional elections of 1998 [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] , for federal and state deputies in the most populated states São Paulo and Minas Gerais. It was first claimed that the probability density function (PDF) of the number of votes P (v) for deputies presented, as a common feature, a power law decay P (v) ∼ 1/v α , with exponent α = 1 [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . Diverse opinion dynamics models were then proposed to explain such behavior [7] [8] [9] 13] . The simple Sznajd dynamics (only agreeing pairs of individuals can convince their neighbors [4] ) appeared to be enough to explain the power-law exponent α = 1. A * E-mail: oangelo@gmail.com † E-mail: nuno@if.uff.br ‡ E-mail: celia.fis@puc-rio.br robust result almost independent of the network properties [7, 8] . A simple contagion model [13] was also able to reproduce the 1/v behavior, but the small-world effect appeared to be crucial in that case. For Brazilian city councillors, the exponent was found to be larger than unit [10] . Elections with proportional rules in other countries were also analyzed, like India [9] , Finland [11] and Italy [14] , revealing that the powerlaw exponent, or even the power-law itself, was not robust [14] . As a consequence, it was argued that an essential feature to capture a universal behavior was to take into account the role of parties [11, 14, 15] . In fact, it is sound that a voter chooses first a party, following its ideology, and then the voter chooses a candidate belonging to that party. Moreover, voters may be influenced by the fact that the total amount of votes for a party will decide the corresponding number of seats. However, at least in the Brazilian elections, several features hamper a meaningful normalization by party: i) electoral choices largely rely on the personal characteristics of candidates [16] and although voting for a party is allowed, most people vote mainly for candidates directly (within an open list system), ii) there are over 30 political parties, distributed in a broad spectrum of orientations [17] but parties occasionally merge together or split and there are also alliances, in some cases of mixed political orientation, and iii) there are no electoral thresholds to disqualify parties with low representativity. Then, we will not tackle here aspects related to parties. We aim to gain insights on the formation of preferences of the electorate about candidates only.
We analyze Brazilian elections for legislators during the period 1970-2010, for which data are available at the website of the Brazilian Federal Electoral Court [18] . This period encompasses elections that took place during the civilian governments after 1986, as well as during the precedent military dictatorship, allowing to investigate the impact of very different political regimes on vote distributions. Complementarily, we also consider the elections for city councillors during 2000-2012. A detailed description of the electoral context is provided in the Appendix. After the empirical analysis presented in Sec. II, we will introduce in Sec. III a model that allows to understand the features observed in real data analysis. A comparative study of model and empirical data follows in Sec. IV, ending by a discussion in Sec. V.
II. VOTE DISTRIBUTIONS
The typical shape of the probability density function P (v) of the quantity of valid votes received by candidates is illustrated in Fig. 1 , by means of the data of the two elections for deputies of Rio de Janeiro state in 2010. Both PDFs display an initial almost flat region, within statistical fluctuations, and a power-law regime over two decades, truncated by a rapid decay. That is, relatively small, intermediate and large numbers of votes show different statistics. Small numbers of votes (up to ∼ 10 3 from a total of ∼ 10 7 , in the case of the figure) are almost uniformly distributed, intermediate numbers (approx. in the range 10 3 − 10 5 ) are scale-free distributed [19] and very large quantities of votes are outliers, typically corresponding to the number of votes received by famous people or very popular experienced politicians. Actually they are the election winners! Although the crossover between the uniform and scale-free regimes, as well as the exponent α, may change from one case to another, the profile of P (v) shown in Fig. 1 displays the general form found for other electoral years and for other states. More- over, notice that both PDFs shown in the figure are very close to each other, specially the scale-free region with power-law exponents that coincide within error bars [20] . The main difference is in the level of the flat region, indicating a larger fraction of candidates receiving few votes in the elections for state deputies, which also present a larger number of candidates (see the Appendix).
For each PDF, the exponent α was obtained by fitting a power-law to the scale-free region. Figure 2a shows α as a function of the electoral year for the state deputies elections in the four most populated states. The outcomes for federal deputies in these states, as well as the results for both deputies in the remaining states, display similar tendencies. In contrast with the results for São Paulo and Minas Gerais in 1998 [6, 10] , the exponent α typically differs from 1. The histogram of the values of α obtained for each state is shown in Fig. 2b for the case of state deputies. A comparison of the values of α as a function of time for both deputies elections, grouping the whole Brazilian electorate, is shown in Fig. 2c . Notice that, specially in the democratic period, the values of α for both elections at the same calendar coincide within error bars [20] .
For each state, as well as for the whole Brazilian electorate, one observes that α typically increases with time, except for the peak at 1986. The two political regimes clearly have a different impact in the behavior of parameter α. A rapid increase with time occurs during the dictatorship and a slow one during democracy. The variability of the exponent α cannot be explained simply by differences in the quantity of votes N v or of candidates N c , although all tend to increase with time. In fact, for instance, the most notable changes in α with a record value in 1986, occur in a period of relative stability of the electorate size. On the other hand, for the full Brazilian electorate, it is clear in Fig. 2c the proximity of the values of α for federal and state deputies in the democratic period, despite the number of candidates N c differs (see Appendix), and mainly despite the pools of candidates are distinct.
For senators, the number of candidates per state is too small (e.g., only eleven in Rio de Janeiro in 2010) to build an histogram, however we obtained P (v) for the whole electorate. P (v) also decays as a power-law, although the plateau phase is lacking, reflecting the absence of candidates with few votes. In Fig. 3 , we compare the PDFs of votes for senators and deputies for the whole Brazilian electorate in 2010. Notice the coincidence of the PDFs in the scale-free region, for the three different elections with different candidates but the same electorate. The present statistical analysis indicates that: i) α is not universal, ii) it tends to increase with time, iii) for a given electorate, it takes a defined value. That is, α seems to be associated to some property of the electorate or its interactions, independently of the pool of candidates and beyond the electorate size. Therefore, the scale-free regime may reflect a fundamental feature of the complex collective processes involved.
III. MODEL
Previously proposed models reproduce the 1/v law but do not allow to describe the PDF decay of the form 1/v α with generic α that we observe in real data. We propose a simple model, where we describe the temporal evolution of the quantity of votes v i (t) received by each candidate i as a continuous variable. This is justified by the fact that the fractions v i /N v tend to assume continuous values in the limit of a very large number of voters. In analogy to multi-species models of population dynamics, we consider that the number of voters for candidate i, hence the quantity of votes v i , follows a logistic-like growth dynamics. Then, the time evolution is governed by a set of ordinary differential equations of the form
where r i , c and γ are positive parameters, and 0 ≤ f i ≤ 1 limits the quantity of votes. Randomness is a realistic ingredient of social dynamics, relative both to individual attitudes and to social influences [1] . Then, one should consider in principle the equation parameters as stochastic variables to reflect the heterogeneity of the electorate and its interactions. However, for simplicity, we will assume heterogeneity in the parameters where it is more crucial, as discussed below.
The coefficient r i represents a kind of fitness of candidate i. It is related to the capacity of persuasion determined by a set of attributes attached to the candidate, such as its political proposal or personal appeal. A negative value would lead to a vanishing fraction of votes. Then, for the candidates that win votes, the parameter r i should take positive values. We consider that the population of candidates is heterogeneous with respect to this parameter, according to a given PDF P r (r). A similar kind of heterogeneity has been assumed in the cellular automata of Ref. [8] , where the probability of convincing is different for each candidate in a first stage where only candidates can influence voters.
The propagation of opinions about candidates is a sort of branching or multiplicative process [6, 10] , in which a supporter of a given candidate can persuade, with a given probability, a fraction of its neighbors, and each one of them in turn can influence others. In the standard case, the intrinsic rate of growth per capita of the number of votes v i is constant, given by r i . However, if there were a positive feedback between individuals, the rate per capita would increase with v i , which can be described by γ > 1. A similar idea of self-reinforcing mechanisms, that can lead to herding behavior, have already been considered in the context of financial bubbles [21] . But avalanches of opinion propagation can occur in other contexts too [22] . The "better connected" is the electorate, the larger γ. This does not mean higher mean connectivity or higher probability of contagion, but that the probability of contagion becomes larger as the number of followers increases. A negative feedback may also occur and is represented by γ < 1. It is true that one could associate a different γ to each candidate, reflecting the particular feedback of the community in which the candidate exerts influence. However, we will consider that γ is predominantly homogeneous across a given electorate.
The introduction of parameter c allows to contemplate the existence of two realistic regimes, as considered in a previous model of elections [8] . In an initial phase when v i c, candidates influence voters either directly or through their staff, independently of the number of followers of each candidate. Otherwise, when the number of followers becomes large enough, people interact and become influenced by other electors too. Then c can be related to the spreading which is independent of the number of followers v i , and may also include the effect of the media through which a candidate can spread its influence and gain voters. This parameter could be in principle a random parameter, different for each candidate, but also in this case we will take it as homogeneous.
Finally, we consider a logistic factor of the general form
that assumes that each quantity of votes v i follows a logistic growth, up to a maximum value β i N v , with 0 < β i ≤ 1, corresponding to the portion of the electorate a candidate would conquer in the absence of other candidates. The last term is responsible for coupling the equations and describes the inter-specific competition amongst candidates in their struggle for conquering voters, where β ij measures the competitive effect of candidate j on candidate i. In modeling voting processes, it is commonly considered as a more realistic situation, that when the election occurs the opinion dynamics has not necessarily attained yet the steady state [8] . Then, as soon as the logistic term affects only the long-time dynamics, for simplicity, we consider that β ij = β i = 1, ∀i, j.
Besides randomness in the equation parameters, another source of variability may reside in the initial distribution of votes v 0i ≡ v i (0). It is clear that there are candidates with a political history and hence may start with a given community of followers, then, it would be interesting to investigate realistic initial distributions. However, if the initial numbers of votes are relatively small, as expected for the majority of the candidates, their precise values will not affect the distribution at later times, at least for v i 1. Then we will set v 0i = 1 for all candidate i, corresponding to the minimal value of its own vote.
Summarizing the model description, under the above assumptions, the evolution equations are reduced to the simple form
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N c , where γ and c are positive constants and r i is the only random parameter. We assume that it is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. (Notice that introducing a different maximal value of r will be equivalent to rescaling the time, then we chose the unit interval.) That is, the model depends on only two parameters that appear to be the most relevant ones. From the numerical integration of this set of differential equations, we obtained P (v). We considered the values of v i at the steady state, however the results of the model are not significantly affected if we do not wait for the steady state to be reached. As illustrated in Fig. 4 , the model produces outcomes qualitatively similar to the empirical ones, with a flat region and a power-law decay. Notice however that the last phase of rapid decay of the distribution is not present. In fact, as discussed above, very popular candidates gaining very large numbers of votes are those contributing to the cutoff, but they are not contemplated by our model in its present form, which assumes a uniform distribution of r. This could be readily improved by modifying P (r), to take into account people with outstanding fitness, but we are interested here in the free-scale regime. A pictorial representation of the model is given in Fig. 5 . It illustrates the two mechanisms of dissemination of ideas of a candidate i: i) without participation of the electorate, for low v i compared to c the propaganda of the candidate dominates the diffusion process, and ii) when the number of followers v i is large enough, the phase of interactivity of the electorate occurs with feedback (γ = 1) or without it (γ = 1). The (positive) feedback is represented in the picture by thicker lines. In the measure than the number of followers of a candidate grows, the probability or rate per capita of convincing the nearest neighbors in the network of contacts also increases. The scale free regime is associated precisely to this interactive phase. Actually, there is a third regime, when the number of undecided people becomes small ( v i (t) ∼ N v , hence the factor f i tends to zero), a phase of competition between candidates operates, that is not represented in the picture. The distribution P (v) resulting from the model can be analytically evaluated. At sufficiently short times the evolution of N i will not feel the competition term and the equations are uncoupled. This corresponds to an initial phase in which voters interact mainly with candidates in its network of influence. As a first approximation, integrating Eq.
This approximate expression is expected to hold up to a time close to the upper threshold given by the condition v i (t) = N v (f i = 0). Eq. (4) provides the dependence between the random variables v and r that allows to find the relation between their PDFs, by equating P (v)dv = P r (r)dr. In particular, let us consider that r is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1]. In this case, we obtain that the distribution of v(t) is
In fact this approximate expression is in good accord with the results of the numerical integration of the model (see Fig. 4 ). It also satisfactorily describes real distributions, with only two parameters c and γ, which control the crossover, between the plateau and the scale-free regimes, and the power-law decay, respectively. Then Eq. (5) allows to identify the fitting exponent α with the intrinsic exponent γ, furnishing a direct interpretation for the origin of the scale-free regime. Namely, the exponent α ≡ γ can be associated to the degree of feedback of the spreading processes.
IV. COMPARISONS WITH REAL DATA
Let us first analyze size effects. In all the empirical cases the electorate size, measured by N v , is very large compared to the number of candidates N c . Within the realistic range in which N v N c holds, the effect of an increase of N v on the PDF of votes (not shown) is to extend the power law range, as soon as larger values of v become possible. As a consequence, the flat level decreases to preserve the norm. This is the same effect observed in real data ( Figs. 1 and 3) . The power law range also increases if N c decreases (as illustrated by the cases of deputies in Fig. 3 ).
In Fig. 6 , we show a comparison of the model outcomes with results for state deputies and senators (whole electorate) in 2010. We used γ = 1.2, that corresponds to the average value, across states, in that year (from the distribution shown in Fig. 2b) , and we run 26 samples with the empirical values of N c and N v for each state.
The case of state deputies is shown in Fig. 6a . A very good accord of the PDF from simulations with that of real data is observed. The value of α from fits allows to recover the intrinsic value γ = 1.2. In general, simulations fail in describing the initial portion, which is not completely flat. This could be improved by using a realistic initial distribution of votes, instead of v i0 = 1 for all i. Because, although this condition does not affect the distribution of large values of v, it does affect the distribution of v ∼ 1.
The case of senators is shown in Fig. 6b . A small number of candidates, together with a very large value of c, needed to fit the data in that case, may distort the intrinsic value (γ) of the scale-free regime, yielding α < γ = 1.2, as shown in Fig. 6b . This may explain the apparently smaller value of α, compared to those of deputies, observed in the case of senators (Fig. 3) , with few candidates per state. Let us consider now the PDFs for city councillors. These PDFs also present the same characteristic shape shown for legislators, but with a larger value of the exponent α, as already known [10] . Following our model, this exponent might be related to the connectedness or feedback characteristic of each electorate, the electorate of each city in this case. If this were true, the same exponent should be observed in other vote distributions for the same electorate. To test this hypothesis, we compared distinct elections in the same city. In order to do that, we restricted the analysis done for legislators to the electorate of each city considered. Because of the better statistics, we analyzed only state capital cities. The results for Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo cities are presented in Fig. 7 . Recall that elections for city councillors and deputies occur on alternate even years. The exponent α for both deputies coincides within error bars [20] . Notice that although the candidates are different, the points representing the exponent α for deputies and city councillors exhibit a continuity, belonging almost to a same curve. This reinforces the idea that this exponent is associated to a feature of the electorate and its interactions. We also plotted for comparison the exponent for the remainder of the electorate in each state. It displays lower values close to those of the whole state electorate, presented in Fig. 2 . It is also remarkable that the values of α for large urban conglomerates are larger than those for the population of the corresponding state out of the capital city, consistent with the larger interactivity expected for an urban population.
V. DISCUSSION
We analyzed the distributions of votes P (v) for different Brazilian elections along the years of 1970-2012. P (v) typically presents a flat region followed by a power-law decay. The crossover between them may change as well as the power-law exponent, from one case to another. However, the responses of the same electorate (from a given capital city or state) to distinct elections with a different pool of candidates, present very similar exponent α (as observed in Figs. 1, 2c, 3 and 7 ), suggesting that this exponent reflects a feature that is predominantly characteristic of the electorate. Another noticeable feature is the tendency of this exponent to increase with time.
This tendency occurs not only for global data but also for the data restricted to each state or city, as shown in Fig. 2 .
We introduced a new model of opinion formation in elections, very different from previous ones, which consists in a N c -dimensional nonlinear dynamical system, similar to multi-species models of population dynamics. Stochasticity was introduced through the fitness parameter r. The model is validated by its ability in describing the features of the empirical distribution of votes and could be useful to tackle other questions related to electoral processes as well.
Under the light of our model, the variability of α appears to be a reflection of the variability of the mechanisms through which voters interact. Namely, the exponent reflects the degree of feedback of the population. This explains why the values of α coincide for the same electorate and are larger for urban centers, with higher interactivity than rural areas. It is also noticeable that typically α is larger than one for the democratic regime, indicating a positive feedback of the electorate.
Contrarily, during the dictatorship, lower than one or even almost null values of α are observed. According to the model, they can be associated to negative feedback (α < 1) and absence of interaction of the electorate (large c), respectively. Both are consistent with a dictatorial regime imposing severe restrictions to social interactivity, generating distrust and negative feedback. In the measure that some of the restrictions to democracy gradually relaxed towards the end of the military regime, the increase of α is observed. Concerning the record value of α in 1986, it may be related to diverse factors that favored the participation of a large and active electorate. Besides marking the end of the military period, in this opportunity the legislators responsible for the elaboration of a new Constitution (the 1988 Constitution) were to be chosen. It is remarkable that the singular historical context could in fact have promoted a particularly high positive feedback in the Brazilian electorate. Besides the intrinsic features discussed above as responsible for a lower value of α, another factor that may contribute to underestimate the value of α is a low number of candidates, as already observed for senators. In fact, candidatures and electoral choices were initially small and increased during the transition from bipartidism to pluripartidism.
The increase of α in the last two decades, during the democratic phase, is consistent with the fact that the way people interact is changing. The number of people accessing Internet has increased in that period and, mainly in the last decade, the number of people connected to social networks (such as, Orkut, Twitter, Facebook, etc.) has increased too. Moreover, people may participate in more than one of these platforms and members may belong to groups of interest. These groups of people holding common interests may propitiate a rapid consensus among their participants and a positive feedback.
Our model could still be improved to be more realistic, for instance, by modifying the distributions of r and/or of the initial distribution of votes v 0 . But, even in its present form, it captures the more relevant ingredients and it is able to model real data. In particular, the model allow to relate the scale-free regime to the degree of feedback in the electorate interactivity. The changes of α with time and the larger values of α observed for urban centers are consistent with this view. It is remarkable that election statistics furnishes a measure, through the effective parameter α, of the population interactivity feedback which rules the propagation of electoral preferences. This measure could be taken into account to design campaign strategies according to the electorate mood. But it may be useful also in other contexts since it reflects a property of the population interactivity, which governs the propagation of opinions and influences.
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APPENDIX: ABOUT THE DATA
We analyzed the nominal votes of the elections for different kinds of legislators in Brazil (senators, federal deputies and state deputies) and also city councillors.
Senators and federal deputies are congressmen, representatives of a given state (from a total of 26 States in the federation and a federal district), in the senate and in the chamber of deputies of the national Congress, respectively. While federal deputies are in proportion to the population of the respective State, there is a fixed number of senators for any State (3 per State, hence a total of 81, including the federal district). State deputies are local representatives elected to serve in the unicameral legislature of each state. All deputies serve during a four-year term, while senators serve during eight-year terms, being renewed one-third and two-thirds of the senate in alternate electoral calendars. All these elections occur simultaneously in the same countrywide electoral event, together with the election for president and governors, at four-year intervals. From a pool of candidates in each state, an elector can choose one name of each class (two senators, instead of one, in the years when two-thirds are renewed).
Councillors serve during four-year terms in each city council and are voted in the same municipal election in which voters chose mayors, every four years, in even years alternating with presidential elections.
In the proportional elections here considered, besides the possibility of voting on a candidate (nominal vote), a citizen can vote directly on a party (the so called "legenda" vote), without specifying a particular candidate. Actually, only a minority of the electorate practices this possibility (4-18%). Let us also mention that abstention, invalid votes and blank votes are all ignored in vote counting for proportional seat allocation purposes.
We scrutinized the distribution of votes for candidates (nominal votes) only. That is, blank, invalid votes, as well as, valid legenda votes were not taken into account, following our aim of gaining insights on the formation of opinions about candidates.
Electoral sizes are shown in Fig. 8 . The quantity of (valid nominal) votes, N v , and the number of candidates, N c , for deputies and senators of all the states together vs the electoral year are plotted.
The electorate gradually increased, faster than the population, after the establishment in 1985 of the voluntary voting for illiterate and minors between sixteen and eighteen years of age.
Both kinds of deputies are voted in the same electoral event and only one name can be indicated by each voter, then the respective total number of voters (hence of votes) N v are very close. The same occurs for senators, except that two names, instead of one, can be elected in alternate calendars when two-thirds of the senate is renewed, hence the quantity of votes is about twice the quantity of votes for deputies in those occasions.
The total of candidates N c for the state legislatures is always larger than for the national one, reflecting the larger number of total seats to be assigned. The number of candidatures for senators is still smaller, not only because the number of seats is smaller but also because senators must meet more requirements for eligibility. The number of candidates was lower during the military dictatorship due to the several restrictions, increased after the restoration of pluripartidism in 1980 and attained a relative stabilization at a higher level after 1986. The number of parties N p is also represented, evincing the period of bipartidism during the dictatorship and the progressive reintroduction of the multiparty system. 
